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tional context, shaped by the end of World War II (WWII) and the beginning of the Cold War, posed for the country’s 
economic development plans. Drawing largely on new Mexican primary sources along with American, British, and 
multilateral organizations’ documents, this work will focus on the strategy that the Miguel Alemán administration 
(1946-1952) designed in order to adapt to the adverse conditions that the bipolar conflict generated for Latin Ameri-
ca’s industrial developmental projects. This article will show that in spite of the adverse setting, the Alemán govern-
ment was able to create and launch an ambitious plan for economic industrialization that implemented developmen-
tal measures on a large scale. In addition, this work will also show that a crucial ingredient for the initial success of 
Mexico’s economic strategy was the country’s capacity to attract economic aid and political support from Washing-
ton. Paradoxically, this happened at a time when the United States’ (US) economic and political backing of Latin 
American developmental projects had become a scarce currency in the Western Hemisphere.
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RESUMEN: Adaptándose a un nuevo mundo: México y su estrategia internacional de desarrollo económico al al-
bor de la Guerra Fría, 1946-1952.- Este artículo tiene como objetivo analizar los intentos de México para superar 
los obstáculos que el nuevo contexto internacional, dibujado por el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y por el co-
mienzo de la Guerra Fría, planteó para los planes de desarrollo económico del país. Basado en gran parte sobre nue-
vas fuentes documentales mexicanas, además de estadounidenses, británicas y de organizaciones internacionales 
multilaterales, este trabajo se centra en la estrategia que la administración de Miguel Alemán (1946-1952) puso en 
marcha para adaptarse a las condiciones adversas que el conflicto bipolar generó para los proyectos de desarrollo 
industrial de América Latina. Este artículo muestra que, a pesar del escenario adverso, la administración de Alemán 
fue capaz de elaborar y lanzar un ambicioso plan de industrialización que supuso la adopción de medidas de corte 
desarrollista a gran escala. Además, este trabajo mostrará que un ingrediente crucial para el éxito inicial de la estrate-
gia económica mexicana, fue la capacidad del país de atraer ayuda económica y política por parte de Estados Unidos. 
Paradójicamente, esto ocurrió en un momento en que Estados Unidos se había mostrado crecientemente reacio a 
apoyar políticamente y económicamente los proyectos desarrollistas en América Latina.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Historia Internacional; Historia global de la Guerra Fría; Historia Contemporánea de Améri-
ca Latina; Historia Contemporánea de México; Historia del Tercer Mundo
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INTRODUCTION: LATIN AMERICA’S 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES VERSUS 
WASHINGTON’S EARLY COLD WAR POLICIES
This article is aimed at analyzing Mexico’s attempts 
to overcome the obstacles that the new international con-
text, shaped by the end of World War II (WWII) and the 
beginning of the Cold War, posed for the country’s eco-
nomic development plans. Drawing largely on new Mexi-
can primary sources along with American, British, and 
multilateral organizations’ documents, this work will fo-
cus on the strategy that the Miguel Alemán administration 
(1946-1952) designed in order to adapt to the adverse 
conditions that the bipolar conflict generated for Latin 
America’s industrial developmental projects. This article 
will show that in spite of the adverse setting, the Alemán 
government was able to create and launch an ambitious 
plan for economic industrialization that implemented de-
velopmental measures on a large scale. In addition, this 
work will also show that a crucial ingredient for the initial 
success of Mexico’s economic strategy was the country’s 
capacity to attract economic aid and political support 
from Washington. Paradoxically, this happened at a time 
when the United States’ (US) economic and political 
backing of Latin American developmental projects had 
become a scarce currency in the Western Hemisphere.
The Alemán administration’s capacity to launch and 
carry out a plan of state-led economic modernization, 
along with his ability to “persuade” the Harry Truman ad-
ministration to support it, singled out Mexico as a rather 
exceptional case in the hemisphere. During the second 
half of the 1940s, Washington, reverting to what had been 
its orientation since the second half of the 1930s, moved 
toward a policy of stiff opposition to Latin America’s de-
velopmental strategies, thus seriously hampering their 
feasibility (Helleiner, 2006: 943-967; Bethell and Rox-
borough, 2005: 313). While the United States showed re-
luctance to support Latin America’s industrial develop-
ment by instead advocating free trade and incentives to 
attract private investments as a way to promote growth in 
the Western Hemisphere, the majority of Latin American 
countries defended a developmental model based on pro-
tectionism, industrialization, and increasing state’s inter-
ventionism in the economy. Moreover, Latin American 
countries claimed that American financial and technical 
support represented a crucial factor for the feasibility of 
their developmentalist projects and thus advocated for a 
sharp increase in US’ aid (Urquidi, 2005: 122-126).
Although the Truman administration initially adopted 
a flexible approach to these issues, with the intensifica-
tion of the Cold War in Europe and its escalation to Asia, 
Washington’s stance regarding the problem of continental 
development became increasingly more rigid. The Tru-
man administration focused on Europe and Asia, where 
the majority of American political and economic resourc-
es were progressively channeled, relegating the Western 
Hemisphere to a secondary position (Leffler, 1992: 60, 
160). Consequently, on a multilateral level, the US gov-
ernment showed reluctance to assume the role of benevo-
lent godfather to Latin America’s industrialization, insist-
ing on the need to open southern economies to foreign 
investments and liberalize their trade. Undoubtedly, this 
recipe represented a low-cost approach for Washington to 
the problem of Latin American development, which rath-
er than relying on US public resources hinged on private 
investments and trade liberalizations.
While neglecting economic cooperation, the Truman 
administration’s multilateral efforts became obsessively 
reliant on the creation of a continental mechanism of mil-
itary cooperation that was aimed at containing Soviet 
“expansionism” in the Western Hemisphere and tighten-
ing Latin America’s Cold War loyalty (Rabe, 1978: 279-
294). This pattern became increasingly evident during the 
cycle of inter-American gatherings that took place be-
tween the 1945 Chapultepec Conference on the Problems 
of War and Peace and the 1948 IX Inter-American Con-
ference of Bogotá, which led to the creation of the Or-
ganization of American States (OAS).
At Chapultepec, disagreements on the future of eco-
nomic cooperation sharply emerged but pressure from the 
US dictated procrastination on any decisions related to 
this matter. In contrast, negotiations on hemispheric mili-
tary cooperation were relentlessly pushed by Washington 
and advanced, culminating during the 1947 Río Confer-
ence in the establishment of an Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance (Rabe, 1978: 282-284; Urquidi, 
2005: 123). While Washington repeatedly tried to deplete 
the recently founded United Nation’s (UN) Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA, CEPAL in Span-
ish) of its functions and eventually merge it with the tam-
er Inter-American Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), North-South tensions on economic planning 
reached their climax during the Bogotá Conference, 
which along with the creation of the OAS, should have 
also finally discussed the terms of hemispheric economic 
cooperation. However, although the conference approved 
the OAS’ political structure as well as a continental anti-
communist declaration, it failed to ratify a regional eco-
nomic chart, which resulted in a standoff that lasted until 
the end of the 1950s (Dosman, 2010: 254; Carr, 2013: 
39-41).
Against this backdrop, this article shows that Mexi-
co’s capacity to design and carry out its developmental 
policies, along with the Miguel Alemán government’s 
ability to attract significant US political and economic 
support, represent an extraordinary exception to Latin 
America’s multilateral patterns during the early Cold War 
period. In this regard, this work first shows how the 
Alemán government subtly used the relevance that Wash-
ington gave to Mexico’s internal political stability to ex-
ert pressure over the Truman administration and thus 
push through the concession of economic aid. Secondly, 
it retraces the skillful use that the Mexican administration 
made of its regional foreign policy to persuade the Tru-
man administration to grant, along with the revision of 
bilateral commercial relations in favor of Mexico’s pro-
tectionist positions, the financial help that the country 
needed to back its plans of domestic development. In 
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conclusion, what this article shows is that through a skill-
ful international strategy, Mexico was able to protect its 
economy and foster state-led industrialization while si-
multaneously receiving US aid and support.
This study, which is part of a broader research project 
on the international history of Mexico’s developmental 
processes between 1947 and 1982, intertwines with sev-
eral specific historiographical debates to which it aims to 
give a substantial and original contribution. First, it aims 
to enrich our knowledge of a period and a theme notori-
ously overlooked by historiography.1 At the beginning of 
the 1980s, Mexican scholars competently addressed the 
study of Mexican contemporary history, but they did not 
have access to the primary sources we now have. Thus, 
although historians, such as Blanca Torres, produced 
compelling studies on the Mexican industrialization pro-
cess under Alemán, their works inevitably made little use 
of archival resources, not to mention multi-archival ones. 
Moreover, such studies have tended to address the inter-
national and domestic aspects of this process separately 
(Torres, 1984).
Although in the following decades Mexican scholars 
such as Lorenzo Meyer (2007: 309-322, 2010: 202-242), 
Soledad Loaeza (2010a: 627-660, 2010b), and Ariel Rod-
riguez Kuri (2009: 512-559, 2012), among others, have 
made significant contributions to our comprehension of 
Mexico’s contemporary history, their analyses have not 
specifically focused on the period and the problems ad-
dressed by this work. Thus far, one of the few scholars to 
have addressed this subject in detail and with a vast range 
of international and Mexican primary sources is Stephen 
R. Niblo (1995, 1999); however, his two monographs are 
approximately ten years old as of 2014. In his pioneering 
but isolated analysis of the period, Niblo portrays the 
1940s as an epoch of moderation within the context of the 
revolutionary radicalism that had marked Mexico during 
the leadership of President Lázaro Cárdenas. This involu-
tion, which would have culminated with president 
Alemán’s conservative turn of late 1940, implied, accord-
ing to Niblo (1995: XII-XIV, 1999: 75), the slowing down 
of the agrarian reform pace, the shift to a new develop-
ment model based on growth by means of industrializa-
tion, and a much more acquiescent attitude toward Wash-
ington’s political pressures and economic interests. 
Particularly relevant for the issues under scrutiny here is 
Niblo’s argument that Alemán’s industrialization project 
represented “an amazing about-face in the nation’s strate-
gy of industrialization,” which from “a desire to promote 
national industrialization gave way to a policy of direct 
association with U.S. industrialists” Niblo (1995: 186, 
206). The lack of robust, convincing protectionist meas-
ures and the friendly attitude toward foreign investments, 
meaning American ones, would have represented, accord-
ing to Niblo (1995: 186, 200-217), tangible evidence of 
the aforementioned involution.
However, this article reaches different conclusions 
from Niblo’s. This work shows that in spite of the in-
creasing pressures the Cold War unleashed over Latin 
America’s developmental plans, Mexico was able to re-
sist American continental policies by carrying out an am-
bitious state-led developmental strategy aimed at acceler-
ating the industrialization of the country. In this sense, 
this article suggests that the developmental model adopt-
ed by Mexico during the Alemán presidency, which 
hinged on increasing federal government’s intervention-
ism and, actually, on a strong amount of commercial pro-
tectionism, was not an adjustment to US interests. Rather, 
it was an autonomous strategy aimed at transforming and 
developing the country, and it was carried out in spite of 
Washington’s initial opposition instead of in connivance 
with American interests.
Second, adopting what Tony Smith (2000: 567-591) 
has defined as a “pericentric” perspective, this article rep-
resents an attempt to follow, and apply to the Latin Amer-
ican studies field, the recent methodological turn that 
calls both for decentralization and globalization of the 
history of the Cold War (Westad, 2007; Byrne, 2013: 101-
123). Therefore, by focusing on Mexico and taking ad-
vantage of Mexican primary sources, this study hopes to 
strengthen the recent tendency aimed at rescuing Latin 
American states’ agency in a context where the predomi-
nant narrative has usually privileged the study of the su-
perpowers’ points of view2 (Friedman, 2003: 621-636; 
Harmer, 2013; 2014). This does not mean neglecting an 
analysis of the predominant impact that bipolar dynamics 
had on the Third World but rather seeks to add a parallel 
analytical perspective that may help in understanding 
how peripheral actors deciphered such dynamics and 
eventually adjusted to them.
Finally, highlighting Mexico’s capacity to adjust to 
the Cold War’s new international system and to use its 
dynamic to its own advantage, this work also aims at cre-
ating a new common ground for transcontinental compar-
isons. Indeed, in the end, this article shows that like other 
Third World countries, such as for instance, India or 
Egypt, Mexico was able to ride Cold War streams suc-
cessfully rather than succumbing to their whirlpools. Lat-
in American and Mexican Cold War experiences definite-
ly present their own peculiarities from other realities of 
the global South. However, Latin American and Mexico 
belonged to a broader geographical, political, and eco-
nomic space called the “Third World,” and, along with 
their differences, they also shared many common traits 
with this political region that have been regularly over-
looked by Latin American historiography.
THE PRESIDENCY OF MIGUEL ALEMÁN 
AND THE INCEPTION OF MEXICO’S 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTALIST PROJECT 
FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION
In 1946, Mexico looked at the beginning of the post-
WWII era with a mixture of hope and apprehension. On 
the one hand, during the three decades separating the be-
ginning of the Mexican Revolution from Alemán’s elec-
tion as president, the country had progressively undertak-
en a path of political stabilization of which the 1946 
elections were a landmark. On the other hand, as we shall 
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see, the end of hostilities and the beginning of the Cold 
War seemed to cast a gloomy shadow over Mexico’s ca-
pacity to carry on and accelerate the process of economic 
development that the country had undertaken since the 
mid-1920s.
The creation in March 1929 of the Partido Nacional 
Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Party, PNR) 
through the initiative of one of the leaders of the Sonora 
revolutionary group, Plutarco Calles, during a period 
known as Maximato, had lain the foundation of Mexico’s 
post-1945 political stability. The party, which changed its 
name twice until it assumed the final denomination of 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional 
Revolutionary Party, PRI).during the Manuel Ávila 
Cama-cho presidency (1940-1946), had grouped within 
a single political body the majority of different riotous 
tribes of the revolutionary family, thus creating a 
mechanism for disciplining them (Meyer, 1978: 59). In 
1946, after sev-eral evolutions, the party eventually 
assumed a stable cor-poratist structure that integrated the 
country’s main social and economic sectors into a 
unified political body. Cru-cially, for a country that had 
been plagued by a long civil war and continuous 
military saber-rattling, the Army, which was 
originally represented in the party, was ex-cluded 
from any political representation during the Ávila 
Camacho presidency.3 At the vertex of both the 
institu-tional and political pyramids was the President of 
the Re-public, who in his double role as maximum 
representative of the executive power and leader of the 
national leading party, accumulated and managed during 
his six-year term an extraordinary concentration of 
power. Thus, in spite of the democratic nature 
sanctioned by the 1917 constitu-tion, by the end of 
WWII, Mexico’s political system had assumed a 
corporatist-authoritarian structure whose pil-lars lay in 
the PRI’s political machine and the presidency.
Miguel Alemán’s 1946 election embodied the 
“nor-malization” of the country’s political life, 
which was made possible by the “institutionalization” 
of the revolu-tionary process begun in the late 1920s 
with the creation of the PNR. Alemán was the first 
civilian to occupy the Mexican presidency since the 
beginning of the Revolu-tion in 1910. Most 
importantly, his election had not been opposed by a 
military uprising, as had happened with all previous 
presidential elections after 1910, thereby signi-fying the 
stabilization of civilian power over the country (Krauze, 
1997: 89-179).
This “normality” meant that for the first time in two 
decades, at least in principle, a Mexican post-revolution-
ary president had at his disposal the political and institu-
tional instruments to plan and implement the economic 
and social contents envisioned by the Revolution that 
had been crystallized in the extremely socially advanced 
1917 Constitution. In reality, in spite of the Constitution, 
a ho-mogenous revolutionary program had never 
existed and different contending models of economic 
development cohabited at least until the 1940s. While 
state interven-tionism had always represented a feature 
of the Sonora post-revolutionary étatiste project, 
industrialization as a national policy only became the 
center of the Mexican 
economic project during the late 1940s. During WWII the 
country’s domestic consumption industry grew rapidly as 
a natural consequence of the disappearance of European 
and American imports because of the damages the war 
produced in the Old Continent and the military reconver-
sion of US factories. (Torres, 1984: 39-41). Because of 
WWII, Mexico had somehow involuntarily begun an im-
port substitution industrialization (ISI) process (Carde-
nas, 1987). However, industrialization was also actively 
supported by the government which, with the adoption of 
the Ley de Industrias de Transformación, created fiscal 
stimulus for those industries considered “new and neces-
sary”. Between 1940 and 1946, industrial production 
grew 50% and investment 400% (Puga, 2008: 201-203).
If during the Ávila Camacho the expansion of the in-
dustrial sector had taken off through a mix of state’s inter-
vention and favorable conditions created by WWII, the 
idea of an industrial Mexico as the base for the country’s 
full modernization became an explicit and pivotal pillar 
of Alemán’s electoral program. During his presidential 
campaign, the PRI’s official candidate had repeatedly ar-
gued that only the enhancement of the industrial sector 
could decisively help Mexico in its struggle for develop-
ment (Medin, 1990: 18). Alemán’s ambitious industrial 
project embodied the idea of economic modernization 
that had been predominant in Latin America since the 
1930s, supported in Mexico by economists such as Víctor 
Urquidi, Eduardo Villaseñor, Emilio Alanís Patiño and 
that, at the end of the 1940s, had found a coherent formu-
lation in the writings of Raul Prebisch, the ECLA’s Exec-
utive Director. With the inevitable presence of rhetoric, 
Alemán’s public interventions as a candidate and then as 
an elected president showed his confidence in the fact that 
industrialization would fix the country’s economic insta-
bility, accelerate its social development, and strengthen 
its political independence (Martínez, 2008: 236; Puga, 
2008: 203; Gauss, 2010: 5).4
The main idea underlying Alemán’s economic project 
was that ISI would bring a rapid and stable growth of the 
national gross domestic product (GDP), thus creating ide-
al conditions for enhancing social mobility and the prem-
ise for wealth increase and its redistribution (Medin, 
1990: 105). Within this context, as was argued by Anto-
nio Manero, a Mexican congressman and an influential 
economist of the time, the federal government had to in-
tervene by creating the infrastructural and financial con-
ditions for industrial expansion. According to this vision, 
the central state had to support the economic sectors di-
rectly with national relevance or that involved general so-
cial interests when the private initiative had insufficient 
technical or financial capabilities. In addition, the federal 
government had to plan, build, or finance public works 
aimed at fostering production, trade, and wealth 
mobility.5
The mixed-economy approach proposed by Manero 
and other Mexican technocrats associated, for example, 
to the Banco de México’s Office of Industrial Research, 
did not imply the socialization of the economy, and in 
fact, as Alemán made clear during his electoral campaign 
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and his presidential oath, private initiative had to lead the 
developmental project (Martínez, 2008: 238; Gauss, 
2010: 95-96). However, during the Alemán presidency, 
federal government’s interventionism in the economy 
kept increasing. The government directly carried out in-
dustrial projects or delegated their development to private 
enterprises. Nevertheless in most cases, these projects 
were financed with credit from national lending institu-
tions such as Nacional Financiera S. A. (NAFINSA), the 
country’s leading development bank created in 1934, 
whose capital, under Alemán, increased from 20 million 
pesos in the early 1940s to 100 million pesos in 1947 
(López, 2012: 129-163; Martínez, 2008: 235). A 1950 In-
ternational Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) study reported that NAFINSA had become “in-
creasingly instrumental in Mexico’s industrial develop-
ment since 1948.” According to the report, along with the 
expansion of its industrial investments through bonds and 
shares “by the equivalent of 10 million in 1949,” the 
Mexican public bank had developed:
its promotion activities and its standby operations to 
support private bond issues. Enterprises enjoying Finan-
ciera’s assistance in 1949 included the large Altos Hor-
nos Steelworks, Chapala Electric Co., a paper mill, a 
large new fertilizer plant, Industria Electrica, two sugar 
mills, two textile mills, and a cement plant.6
The state-led economic modernization project also 
pushed the Alemán government to build new roads, dams, 
and irrigation systems. “In many regions of the Repub-
lic,” the aforementioned IBRD report argued, such as, 
“Matamoros, the Yaqui Valley, Mexicali, Sinaloa, the La-
guna region, and soon in the basins of [the] rivers Pa-
paloapan and Tepalcatepec, the face of the land [was] be-
ing literally changed as large dams and irrigation ditches 
[were] completed.”7
The federal government also improved power plants 
and enhanced electrification networks, a sector that had 
become particularly inadequate given the dramatic ener-
gy deficit provoked by the country’s industrial expansion 
during WWII. As reported by a different IBRD study 
published in 1948: “the Federal government has gradual-
ly assumed responsibility for the planning, coordination 
and regulation of the electric power industry.”8
The Alemán presidency’s insistence on economic di-
versification through state-led industrialization and feder-
al government interventionism represented a continua-
tion, with more emphasis on industry, of the étatiste 
model undertaken by the post-revolutionary elite after 
1914 (Knight, 2013: 174). In the 1940s context, however, 
it also closely resembled the ECLA’s message of progres-
sive transformation for Latin American social and eco-
nomic structures. It is not by chance that the first ECLA 
Secretary was a Mexican economist, Gustavo Martinez 
Cabañas, and that Prebisch was invited twice by the Mex-
ican Central Bank to lecture in Mexico, once in 1944 and 
1946. Meaningfully, it was in Mexico City that the 
ECLA’s Executive Director used the key terms “core” 
and “periphery” for the first time (Urquidi, 2005: 120; 
Babb, 2001: 76).
Mexico’s economic plans of industrialization during 
the Alemán presidency indeed had a strong convergence 
with the ECLA’s theorization on ISI and the latter’s role 
as an agent of economic modernization. In fact, the same 
strong belief in the transformative power of industrializa-
tion resounded in the words that Gilberto Loyo, the head 
of the Mexican delegation at the ECLA, pronounced dur-
ing the Commission’s first session: “the per capita income 
of population in secondary or lesser activities [industry], 
is approximately ten times as much as the income of the 
population engaged in primary activities [agriculture].” 
For Loyo, raising the general population’s living stand-
ards meant first increasing the agricultural population’s 
economic level through the growth of agricultural pro-
ductivity based on “irrigation, drainage and [the] con-
struction of roads.” Above all, however, improving the 
Mexican people’s existence meant transferring a “group 
of people from primary activities to more productive 
ones” through “industrial diversity by making use of all 
the possible natural resources of [different] countries.”9
In this sense, it is problematic to argue, as authors like 
Niblo have done, that the adoption of Mexico’s develop-
ment strategy during the Alemán presidency represented 
an “about-face in the nation’s strategy of industrializa-
tion” and supports association with US interests, among 
other things, because of investment friendly policies or 
appeasing protectionist measures.10 Mexico’s post-WWII 
developmental project and its reliance on capitalist indus-
trialization did stand as a departure from Cárdenas’s so-
cio-economic model; this was much more focused on 
agrarian production and redistribution along communal 
property lines and was oriented toward a much more so-
cialized economy. However, this change in the model did 
not necessarily mean the abandonment of the nationalist 
project of the country’s economic modernization begun 
after 1914 in favor of national or foreign private econom-
ic interests. Indeed, the development model adopted by 
Mexico after WWII went exactly in the opposite direction 
of what Niblo contends. It is one where the federal gov-
ernment played an increasing role and where protectionist 
measures were systematically implemented even when 
these actions implied a clash with the American position 
or national economic groups (Gauss, 2010: 8-10). As 
Alan Knight (2013: 201) has argued, Alemán’s project 
aimed to modernize the country through capitalist mecha-
nisms, this, however, did not signal that either the Presi-
dent or his economic project were comprados or cronies 
of private capital and interests, whether national or 
foreign.
First, contrary to what has been argued by Niblo and 
as we shall see in greater detail later on, protectionism 
was an integral part of the Alemán economic project. In 
1947, at the very beginning of Alemán’s presidency, the 
government adopted legislation that required federal gov-
ernment’s authorization to import products considered 
potential threats to local industrial production (Martínez, 
2008: 238).11 As a complement to this policy, Mexico also 
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refused to enter the 1947 US-sponsored free-trade Gener-
al Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Loaeza, 2010b: 668). 
It might be worth remembering that this happened at a 
moment when Washington’s agenda for trade liberaliza-
tion in Latin America was achieving its climax and that 
since 1942 Mexico had been a signatory of a bilateral 
commercial treaty with the US, which in theory stymied 
the adoption of unilateral protectionist measures (Martín-
ez, 2008: 242).
Second, it is true that foreign investments were well 
received in Mexico at the end of the 1940s, a policy that 
Prebisch himself, to be sure, strongly suggested as a part 
of his general recipe for Latin American economic devel-
opment (Dosman, 2010: 276-277). Nevertheless, the 
Mexican government maintained tight control over its 
quantity, destination and employment. Analyzing the atti-
tude maintained by several Mexican governments toward 
foreign investments after the Revolution, an IBRD 1948 
report highlighted how since the Ávila Camacho adminis-
tration Mexico had maintained a more favorable attitude 
toward those private enterprises interested in productive 
investments in Mexico. However, the report also argued 
that during the Alemán administration:
the government [...] definitely [reserved] the right to 
regulate such investments like the rest of the economy 
of the country and there [was] no slackening of the poli-
cy of intervention and regulation for political, social or 
economic reasons. Different government agencies [had] 
been set up for price control [...] and for official inter-
vention in markets and the labour [sic] field.12
This interventionist attitude actually raised objections 
and opposition among traditional Mexican economic 
elites. The Alemán government faced waves of strong re-
sistance from influential economic actors such as the 
Confederación de Cámaras Nacionales de Comercio 
(National Trade Chambers Confederation, CONCANA-
CO). In addition, powerful, regional economic groups 
such as Monterrey’s and Guadalajara’s industrialists, 
along with Puebla’s cotton producers, also opposed, from 
different perspectives, the industrialist project pursued by 
Alemán. Some of these groups had a vested interest in the 
export sector and feared that the protectionist measures 
adopted by the Alemán administration from 1947 onward, 
such as the new import duties adopted between July and 
November 1947, would backfire and in turn threaten their 
access to American markets. Others considered deleteri-
ous the support Alemán gave to “corporatist labor ar-
rangements”. Moreover, traders and big industrial groups 
also opposed the new taxes Alemán established, such as 
the 15% tax on exports, the administration’s price control 
policies, and the expansion of federal government’s regu-
latory functions through laws such as the 1950 Ley de 
Atribuciones Económicas del Ejecutivo (Torres, 1984: 47, 
95; Gauss, 2010: 10-11).
It is true that state interventionism and protectionism 
did not necessarily imply a redistributive attitude on be-
half of the Alemán’s administration; and this considera-
tion might actually question the transformative nature of 
Mexico’s modernization project launched at the outset of 
the Cold War, especially in comparison with the Cardenas 
period. It is widely accepted that during the so-called 
Mexican Miracle, the fiscal and salary policies of the PRI 
governments were conservative, while domestic savings 
were mostly channeled toward infrastructural inversion 
rather than social programs (Hansen, 1971: 83-95). How-
ever, it is also equally true that, as argued by Roger Hans-
en, the dramatic expansion of the new federal bureaucra-
cy and the new jobs generated by the industrialization 
process, along with the dramatic extension of public edu-
cation, created a strong mechanism of social mobility that 
as a result greatly enlarged the Mexican middle class. 
This sector about doubled its size between 1900 and 
1960, moving from 8.3% of the population to 17.1% 
(Smith, 1979: 43). In 1950, an IBRD study pointed out 
that:
although extreme contrasts of wealth and poverty are 
still a characteristic of Mexican society, it has become 
more democratic in the sense that a strong middle-class 
is growing, and that the movement from one economic 
or social class to another is probably easier in present 
day Mexico than in any other Latin American country.13
According to Hansen (1971: 180-181), this state-
sponsored social mobility, fostered by the developmental-
ist model represents the key to understanding the support 
the PRI’s modernization project also received from sec-
tors of society that would have benefitted from a larger 
federal government’s commitment to direct redistributive 
policies.
Indeed, at the end of the 1940s, the industrialization 
project received firm support from what could be consid-
ered as the progressive sectors of Mexican society, from 
the leftist political establishment and from groups of na-
tionalist industrialists. Mexican nationalist industrialists 
such as José Domingo Lavin, for example, felt that indus-
trialization represented both a tool of national emancipa-
tion and of progressive transformation of society: “los 
enemigos de la industrialización de México son los com-
erciantes que en México y los Estados Unidos tienen el 
privilegio de obtener grandes bienes económicos a base 
de injusticia social.” For Lavin, industrialization meant 
“romper esa situación de privilegio y por eso es combati-
da con toda clase de falsos argumentos.”14 Lavin’s views 
reflected the support which the Cámara Nacional de In-
dustria de Transformación (National Chamber of Trans-
formation Industry, CANACINTRA), of which he had 
been president, had traditionally given to the industrialist 
project at least since the beginning of the 1940s (Puga, 
2008: 208-209).
The link between industrialization and the improve-
ment of the Mexican population’s social conditions was 
also at the root of the support the economic moderniza-
tion project designed by Alemán received from a part of 
the country’s left. The Confederación de Trabajadores de 
México (Confederation of Mexican Workers, CTM) 
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shared the conviction that in the long term, industrializa-
tion would bring better wages and a radical social trans-
formation of the country’s social structures (Torres, 1984: 
21). During Alemán’s electoral campaign, CTM and 
CANACINTRA even signed a cooperation agreement 
aimed at supporting the “revolución industrial de Méxi-
co” (Torres, 1984: 21; Loaeza, 2010b: 667).
Mexico’s political mix of corporatism and authoritari-
anism, along with the state’s interventionism and the en-
hanced social mobility generated by economic develop-
ment, allowed the Alemán administration to reduce the 
impact of national/local resistance to its policies of indus-
trialization, granting them rather solid support. As IBRD 
analysts pointed out:
So far, the civilian government enjoys support from, and 
authority over the army. It devotes a large part of its ef-
forts in developing education, roads, and new lands for 
cultivation, while encouraging industrial production, 
partly by official means. It stands midway between the 
industrialists and bankers whose initiative is commend-
ed and often supported, and the labor forces which are 
split among a number of unions. The government plays 
the role of an umpire, and no grave discontent appears 
to threaten the balance of power.15
However, even though the Alemán administration 
successfully defused local resistance, defying Washing-
ton’s post-WWII plans while simultaneously requesting 
American economic aid turned out to be much more 
problematic. As we shall see, rather than an easy path of 
accommodation to Washington’s interests, Mexico’s de-
termination to undertake a developmental strategy and 
accelerate the country’s industrialization represented, in 
the new post-WWII/Cold War context, a particularly 
challenging path.
ADAPTING TO THE NEW WORLD: MEXICO’S 
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY OF 
DEVELOPMENT
While WWII created a favorable scenario for Mexi-
co’s incipient industrialization, its conclusion and the be-
ginning of the Cold War radically altered the positive eco-
nomic and political premises upon which this process had 
hinged, challenging the feasibility of the developmental 
project designed by the Alemán presidency.
First, the end of hostilities brought about a quick re-
conversion of American industry from a military to civil-
ian focus. This process, combined with the inflation that 
hit the country at the end of WWII, jeopardized the sur-
vival of incipient Mexican industries, which in this new 
context faced serious problems with regard to their com-
petitiveness (Torres, 1984: 39). Second, to make things 
worse, the federal administration’s capacity for interven-
tion in terms of industrial protection was also hampered 
by the aforementioned bilateral commercial treaty signed 
with the US in 1942, which potentially limited control 
over tariffs and import duties; the increase of these tariffs 
represented a potential shield for the defense of the frag-
ile national manufacturers (Torres Bodet, 1970: 22).16 
Third, and most importantly, Mexico faced a dramatic 
lack of funding capacity, which was crucial for the finan-
cial support of its expensive state-led economic moderni-
zation plan (Torres, 1984: 177-178). As Secretary of Fi-
nance Ramón Beteta pointed out in a memorandum that 
analyzed the problems related to Alemán’s development 
project:
El Gobierno del Señor Alemán se esforzará, hasta el 
máximo, porque su programa de obras publica se finan-
cie, con ingresos derivados de sus impuestos [...]. Tiene 
que reconocerse, sin embargo, las limitaciones que con 
que tropezará ese esfuerzo.17
Raising new taxes was indeed problematic in a coun-
try where the thin middle class was already under severe 
pressure from inflation as a consequence of the end of 
WWII. Mexico also had low levels of domestic savings, 
and the vast amount of monetary reserves accumulated by 
the Bank of Mexico during the war had seriously been 
jeopardized by inflation and the dramatic increase of im-
ports from the United States that followed the end of 
WWII. The end of hostilities also decreased the value of 
Latin American, including Mexican, agricultural goods 
and mineral exports, which had previously been a crucial 
source of currency to finance imports of industrial capital 
from abroad. Finally, the increasing inflation made fund-
ing the industrialization by printing new currency prob-
lematic (Torres, 1984: 42, 119-120; Torres Bodet, 1970: 
21). As Beteta argued, given this general context, the only 
solution to the problem of funding had to come from ex-
ternal credit.18
Considering the strong interdependence developed 
between Mexico and Washington during WWII, and bear-
ing in mind the former’s financial and technical needs, the 
resolution of most Mexican problems could be achieved 
by obtaining American political support and economic 
cooperation. Between the end of the 1930s and the con-
clusion of WWII, Mexico’s exports to the US had in-
creased from $117800000 to $262300000. US invest-
ments in the country were primarily focused on the 
industrial sector and had increased by 25%, making Mex-
ico largely dependent on the US for the import of indus-
trial capital. During the same period, Mexico had also re-
ceived a significant credit line of $90 million that was 
aimed at stabilizing the country’s currency and building 
new infrastructures for the country’s modernization 
(Meyer, 2007: 187-189; Ojeda, 1976: 38). From the 
Alemán administration’s point of view, the US had the 
private and public capital Mexico needed to launch and 
support its plan of industrial development. Moreover, out 
of its relations with Washington passed the much-needed 
revision of the 1942 commercial treaty and the possibility 
of raising new tariffs for the protection of Mexico’s na-
tional industry.
Unfortunately, as we have seen, for Latin America the 
new context generated by the Cold War was quickly 
changing the cooperative attitude that had marked Wash-
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ington’s approach to the Western Hemisphere since the 
end of the 1930s.
At the beginning of December 1946, taking advantage 
of the presence of John Snyder, the US Secretary of the 
Treasury, at Alemán’s presidential inauguration, the Mex-
ican government began to sound out the Truman adminis-
tration regarding its potential readiness to economically 
support Mexico’s ambitious plan of industrialization that 
had been nurtured by the new president (Torres, 1984: 
159). The plan submitted to the Secretary of the Treasury 
foresaw the purchase of new agricultural machines; the 
electrification of part of the northwest territory; the con-
struction of new roads, railways, and harbors; and the 
building and modernization of new industrial plants, es-
pecially iron, steel, and textile factories to the tune of 
$180,000,000.19 “A large part of the outlined program” 
argued the US Ambassador in Mexico in a memorandum 
for the Secretary of State dated December 1946, “is obvi-
ously of vital significance to the future course of Mexi-
co’s economy and to the implementation of the Presi-
dent’s declared economic and political policies.”20 During 
the initial months of 1947, at Mexico’s request, the two 
governments had also begun discussing the possible mod-
ification of the bilateral commercial treaty signed in 1942. 
Mexico argued that the end of the war had radically 
changed the conditions upon which the treaty had been 
based and that the treaty did not permit the executive 
branch to stop the incessant stream of goods proceeding 
from the US. Moreover, the Alemán administration ar-
gued that the duties established by the 1942 agreement 
were not adequate to support its new strategy of industri-
alization (Torres Bodet, 1970: 38-47)21.
In principle, Washington had shown reluctance to ap-
prove the credit since with due consideration of its conti-
nental strategy, part of the proposed projects could and 
should be funded with private capital. In reply to Mexi-
co’s solicitations, Snyder transmitted to Beteta his admin-
istration’s desire to “help Mexico in every reasonable 
way but [expressed] that he would have to discourage the 
thought of a large global loan.”22 Washington also showed 
an unwillingness to discuss a modification of the com-
mercial treaty that would allow Mexico to raise its protec-
tionist measures (Torres Bodet, 1970: 41-42)23.
Throughout the year, however, the Truman adminis-
tration’s coldness gradually melted, and in May 1947, a 
few days after the conclusion of President Alemán’s of-
ficial visit to the US, an initial Export-Import Bank loan 
of $50 million dollars was announced along with a sec-
ond $50 million dollar loan by the US Treasury to sup-
port Mexico’s currency.24 Between January 1949 and 
October 1950, Mexico also received $60 million for 
electrification projects from the IBRD (Torres, 1984: 
183-184). The largest deal, however, was achieved in 
August 1950 only after three years of intense negotia-
tion, when the Alemán administration clearly defeated 
the US’ resistance and Washington authorized the con-
cession of a multipurpose Export-Import Bank credit 
line of $150 million. The credit basically covered the 
cost of Mexico’s development projects that were pre-
sented in December 1946 (Torres, 1984: 183-184). 
Eventually, during the same period of time, Mexico was 
also able to convince the administration to review the 
commercial treaty, which after a first round of modifica-
tions favoring the Mexican position, was finally re-
pealed by both countries in July 1950.
The process leading to the modification and repudia-
tion of the commercial treaty along with the approval of 
the main objective of the Alemán administration, the 
$150 million dollar multipurpose loan, was lengthy and 
required the generation of enduring pressure on Washing-
ton from Mexican diplomats. Before its final approval in 
August 1950, the feasibility of the projects submitted for 
funding was examined at length by State Department of-
ficials, the US Embassy in Mexico, led by Walter Thurs-
ton, and Export-Import Bank specialists. Along with the 
projects’ economic soundness, the Mexican fiscal system, 
its monetary reserves, and the balance of payments were 
carefully analyzed to evaluate Mexico’s capacity to repay 
such a large loan.25 As we shall see, it was only the 
Alemán administration’s ability and maneuvering that 
permitted Mexico to overwhelm the persisting ideologi-
cal and technical doubts that surrounded its financial re-
quest and Washington’s opposition to Mexico’s protec-
tionist measures.
In the first place, part of the process that brought mat-
ters to a favorable decision on the concession of the loan 
and the review of the commercial treaty was the combina-
tion of Washington’s willingness to stabilize Mexico’s 
political system and the Alemán government’s subtle use 
of its domestic problems in order to strengthen its negoti-
ating position with the Truman administration.
In August 1947, the US Embassy in Mexico reported 
to the Secretary of State that the Alemán government was 
facing severe problems of stability and that the president 
was “not in as a strong political position now as he was 
during the first six months of his administration.” The 
Embassy pointed out that “the President had encountered 
troubles principally arising out of economic develop-
ments” and that “many of them were perhaps inevitable 
and President Alemán should not be held responsible.” 
According to the Embassy, the high cost of living along 
with the corruption the administration had inherited from 
previous governments were having negative effects on 
the perception the “mass of the people” had of the Alemán 
government. On the other side, “top government plan-
ners” were disappointed at “not being able to carry out 
many of the projects such as dams, irrigation schemes 
and electrical plants which [had] been planned.” “This 
is,” continued the paper, primarily due “to [the] lack of 
funds, and their feeling is closely related to their disap-
pointment that President Alemán has not been able to se-
cure larger loans from the United States.”
This situation triggered a campaign of attacks from a 
sector of the press and left-wing groups related to former 
President Cárdenas as well as the leader of the Popular 
Party and former General Secretary of the CTM, Lom-
bardo Toledano. US diplomats reported that given the 
tense situation, there were rumors indicating that the gov-
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ernment was considering a political shift to the left. The 
document argued that the help given by Washington to 
fight the hoof-and-mouth disease that had dramatically 
affected Mexican cattle at the beginning of the Alemán 
presidency represented a tangible source of help for the 
administration. This form of reduced aid, however, did 
not “touch irrigation projects, and other plans for increas-
ing food production and raising [the] standard of living.” 
The report concluded by reckoning that if
these were carried out, they would form a basis for the 
political stability which his government so sorely needs 
[but] it is difficult to see how any appreciable numbers 
of these projects can be consummated with the money 
available in the country.26
After riots broke out against high bread prices in Sep-
tember, the Embassy released an even more alarming re-
port, indicating that there were rumors regarding a meet-
ing between Alemán, Cárdenas, and Toledano in which 
“the three of them arrived to an understanding with re-
gard to their political relationship.” According to the Em-
bassy, the rumors, even if unconfirmed, showed that 
“President Alemán [was] still making [a] serious effort to 
retain the support of the leftists and [had] not yet decided 
to take a strong stand against them.” Because of corrup-
tion, the campaign against the hoof-and-mouth disease, 
and the “unsettled economic conditions,” the report con-
cluded that “the President may well find himself in a posi-
tion of having to keep hold of any support that he can 
avail himself of.” 27
The alarmist tone of these reports became a constant 
feature of most US diplomatic accounts until the end of 
1948, when a slight improvement in the economic condi-
tions of the country, produced by the July 1948 devalua-
tion and the introduction of the first round of protectionist 
measures, improved Alemán’s political situation.28
These reports and their alarmist tone reflect the im-
portance Washington placed on the Mexican political re-
gime’s stability. Indeed, as CIA (Central Intelligence 
Agency) analysts argued, for the United States, Mexico 
was “strategically important [...] because of geographic, 
political, economic and military factors.” The country 
was an important source of “various strategic materials,” 
and bearing in mind sites that could be “valuable for bas-
es,” it represented a potentially “active war participant on 
the side of the US.”29 In light of these considerations, the 
US diplomats’ close scrutiny of the country’s political dy-
namics, stability, and economic factors is understandable. 
This explains why, regardless of any Mexican attempt to 
use its geographic leverage in order to obtain conces-
sions, the American Embassy was preoccupied with the 
possible destabilization of the country or, in a scenario of 
increasing bipolar tensions, a political shift to the left of 
the Alemán administration. The CIA’s analysis sheds light 
on the spontaneous empathy that the Embassy showed to-
ward the Alemán administration’s problems and explains 
why the Embassy eventually helped providing the tools, 
such as economic aid, that would fix them.
The Miguel Alemán administration, however, was not 
a passive spectator. On the contrary, it proved particularly 
capable of using Washington’s anxieties regarding the 
stability and the political collocation of the country for its 
own benefit. For example, from time to time, US diplo-
mats suspected that Alemán’s threats to move to the left 
simply represented tactical maneuvers on the part of a 
president whom they described as an extremely skillful 
politician. In January 1948, the Embassy reported that it 
had “recently noticed a change in the tone of Mexican of-
ficials [sic] statements regarding the United States.” The 
Embassy excluded a radical change in the Alemán admin-
istration’s policy of cooperation with the United States 
but highlighted that “as a tactical maneuver, Mexican of-
ficials are now trying to give some satisfaction to the 
‘anti-imperialists.’”
Alemán’s use of the tactic was, according to the Em-
bassy, in part an attempt to “combat the impression that 
he [had] become subservient to the United States.” In 
part, however, the concession to the left did represent a 
way to reciprocate “the treatment,” which according to 
Mexican officials, the country had “received from the 
State Department in the negotiations for revising the 
Trade Agreement between the two countries.”30 The skill 
with which the Alemán administration wove its own do-
mestic problems with its strategic necessities and Ameri-
can anxieties in an attempt to achieve its main objectives 
is evident here.
It was within the inter-American arena, however, that 
the Alemán administration fully disclosed its gerryman-
dering and tactical skills, capitalizing on the great impor-
tance Washington gave to Mexico’s hemispheric coopera-
tion. As the aforementioned CIA report reckoned, besides 
geography, Mexico’s strategic relevance for the US also 
had a peculiar political dimension that was rooted in the 
impact the evolution of US-Mexican dynamics had “on 
US relations with other Latin American countries.”31
The CIA alluded to Mexico’s important position with-
in the inter-American system, where the country had 
played a decisive role during, and in the aftermath of 
WWII by helping to strengthen and legitimize the shap-
ing of a hemispheric alliance bounding the Americas 
across the northern and southern parts of the Western 
Hemisphere. As a policy paper issued by the State De-
partment reported, Latin American countries considered 
Mexico “The Sentinel of the Race” and the “Bulwark 
Against the Barbarians of the North”; it further under-
lined that “she [Mexico] holds a position of influence and 
leadership in Latin American affairs.”32
During WWII and up until the 1945 Chapultepec 
Conference, Mexico had been an enthusiastic promoter of 
the inter-American system and had supported Washing-
ton’s integrationist policies, using its influence to promote 
the Pan-American ideal among other Latin American na-
tions (Torres, 1984: 283-292). However, Mexico soon un-
derstood that Washington’s postwar interpretation of Pan-
Americanism relied more on military assistance than on 
improving mechanisms of economic cooperation (Ojeda, 
1976: 66). In reaction to the American militarist ap-
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proach, Mexico adopted a strategy that according to Mex-
ico’s Secretary of State and poet, Jaime Torres Bodet, 
tried to “no hacer de la cooperación una abdicación” 
(Torres Bodet, 1970: 54). Mexico used its cooperation 
with Washington in the inter-American arena as leverage 
to mitigate the superpower’s hegemony and force it to 
make concessions in terms of economic cooperation. This 
strategy was patiently weaved between the 1947 Río and 
the 1948 Bogotá Conferences and bore its fruits in the 
summer of 1950, when the beginning of the Korean War 
made Mexico’s critical and increasingly cold support of 
Washington too risky for the US to sustain given the new 
context.
As an American embassy report issued a few days be-
fore the beginning of the Río Conference reckoned, the 
Mexican delegation had departed for Río “with the inten-
tion of cooperating closely with the delegation of the 
United States.” “At the same time, however,” the report 
continued, “the Mexican representatives will not lose 
sight of the fact that their country is now beset with eco-
nomic troubles and that the solutions of many of its prob-
lems would be greatly facilitated by foreign economic 
help.” In this sense, the Embassy argued that the general 
opinion in the country was that “if the United States ex-
pects Mexico to assume any obligations under a hemi-
spheric defense pact, the Americans must provide Mexico 
with financial assistance to do it.”33
Indeed, compared to the previous gatherings, at Río, 
the Alemán administration’s pugnacity saw a vigorous 
rise. “No hemos venido aquí a sancionar una alianza de 
guerra, sino una asociación jurídica de naciones libres y 
soberanas” argued Torres Bodet during a session of the 
conference. Torres Bodet pointed out that military coop-
eration was not a sufficient guarantee for continental se-
curity and that only the economic improvement of Latin 
American nations could generate the structural conditions 
required to safeguard the security that Washington so 
highly valued in the new Cold War scenario. “Qué es lo 
que encontramos en no pocas regiones de nuestra Améri-
ca?” Torres Bodet asked his audience:
Miseria, hambre, ignorancia y enfermedades. Hasta tan-
to no luchemos contra ellas con la misma unidad de ac-
ción que reconocemos como primer requisito de nuestra 
seguridad política no podremos afirmar que hemos pen-
etrado en el dramático corazón de este problema.
During his intervention, Torres Bodet implicitly criti-
cized the militarist approach that Washington had adopted 
with regard to inter-American relations, underlining the 
lack of consideration for the real social problems and 
their economic roots that affected the continent at the end 
of WWII. The military cooperation pursued by Washing-
ton brought benefits only to the US, while leaving Latin 
America without any compensation in exchange for its 
goodwill.34
This aggressive strategy obviously entailed risks and 
challenges for Mexico, which had to carefully calibrate a 
position that, while putting enough pressure on its power-
ful neighbor to soften its rigidity, could not overstep the 
mark. As Torres Bodet wrote to Alemán from Río:
para delegación Mexicana situación es sumamente 
difícil pues todos nuestros antecedentes históricos oblí-
gannos tomar actitud que no resulte inamistosa para Es-
tados Unidos, pero que no altere tampoco nuestra línea 
de conducta en defensa de seguridad económica como 
garantía seguridad política.35
However, a strategy of opposition and appeasement, if 
wisely balanced, could also grant important victories to 
Mexico as, in fact, systematically happened between 
1947 and 1950 (Torres Bodet, 1970: 54). Eventually, at 
the end of the Río Conference and after having raised its 
voice, Mexico signed the pact of mutual military assis-
tance that Washington had pursued throughout the course 
of the meeting, determining, from the American point of 
view, the positive outcome of the conference. Mexico 
also helped the United States in its successful attempt to 
defer a discussion of economic matters until the Bogotá 
Conference (Torres, 1984: 294-295). Nonetheless, the 
risky mix of resilience and appeasement implemented by 
Torres Bodet also produced extremely positive results for 
his country. On the one hand, Mexico’s attitude forced the 
US to accept the Mexican-Colombian proposal, thereby 
giving its approval for the ECOSOC to begin the formal 
elaboration of an economic charter to be discussed during 
the next Inter-American Conference of Bogotá. On the 
other hand, through this strategy Mexico was creating 
and successfully implementing political leverage that 
would be used to convince Washington to grant support 
for requests made after December 1946, thus allowing 
Mexico to adopt a successful economic development 
strategy.
The strength given to Mexico’s negotiating position 
by its diplomatic maneuvering at the inter-American level 
was disclosed, for example, by a conversation held in No-
vember 1947 by Norman Armour, Assistant Secretary of 
State for Political Affairs, and George S. Messersmith, 
former US ambassador in Mexico, after a visit the latter 
had taken to the country. During his trip, Messersmith 
had maintained a two-hour conversation with Torres Bo-
det, during which he had congratulated the Mexican for-
eign minister on his action at the Río Conference “and 
particularly [on] his support of his United States posi-
tion.” However, Messersmith argued that “Torres Bodet 
was disturbed at the trend of United States-Mexican af-
fairs.” Firstly, according to Messersmith, Torres Bodet 
had pointed out that “although his support of our position 
at the Río to defer economic talks until Bogota was justi-
fied at the time, he is disturbed that adequate preparation 
for Bogota is not being made or, if it is, he, Torres Bodet, 
is not being informed.” Messersmith also reported that 
President Alemán was equally disturbed over these mat-
ters and that both the President and Torres Bodet “feel 
that we are not helping them adequately on their difficult 
financial situation” and that “they do not find the Export-
Import Bank sympathetic to their approach for loans.” 
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Torres Bodet concluded his conversation with the former 
ambassador by mentioning the US-Mexico’s 1942 Trade 
Agreement, saying that US “officials were giving special 
consideration to European countries which they refused 
to give to Mexico” and that “the same situation exists in 
Mexico” where “poverty is widespread”; Torres Bodet 
concluded that “he felt that our former keen interest in 
Mexican affairs was lessening.”
Messersmith concluded his report of his conversation 
with Torres Bodet, stating that he was seriously con-
cerned about the situation and that he wanted Armour to 
be aware of it “for he fears that unless something is done 
before Bogota, we may not be able to rely to the extent 
we did at Rio on Mexican support.”
Armour was definitely moved by Messersmith’s re-
port and stated that the State Department was evaluating 
the possibility of getting assistance for Mexico from the 
International Bank [IBRD], adding that he had hopes that 
the Export-Import Bank would in the close future “look 
more sympathetically toward the Mexican situation.”36
The fact that Mexico had already shown enough cour-
age to speak loudly against Washington’s position, as Tor-
res Bodet did during the Río Conference, made its threat 
to hamper US objectives at the next Inter-American Con-
ference of Bogotá, scheduled for March 1948, credible. 
However, Washington also knew that the Alemán admin-
istration’s belligerency had a price and, in fact, in the 
meanwhile the Truman administration had started to 
show a more flexible approach to Mexico’s economic 
problems and requests.
Indeed, while the pressures exerted by the Alemán 
administration at the inter-American level were not yet 
generating the desired results in terms of loan conces-
sions, they did permit Mexico to progressively bypass 
the 1942 commercial treaty and to raise unilaterally pro-
tectionist measures. Since the bilateral talks for the 
modification of the treaty begun in early 1947 did not 
result in significant advances during the rest of the year, 
Mexico, citing a dangerous decrease of its foreign ex-
change reserves, unilaterally raised two protectionist 
measures, one each in July and November of 1947 (Tor-
res, 1984: 228-229). Mexico’s actions represented an 
infringement of the 1942 treaty and the Truman admin-
istration reacted vehemently, even considering the uni-
lateral denunciation of the agreement. However, as State 
Department Counselor Charles “Chip Bohlen” ex-
plained in a memorandum to the Congressman Harold 
Knutson, after “an exhaustive consideration of all an-
gles of the problem and with overall United States-Mex-
ican relations in mind,” the administration decided to 
avoid a hasty retaliation. Indeed, according to Bohlen, 
the denunciation of the treaty would have been “unfor-
tunate,” making it “more difficult [for] the achievement 
of United States objectives at [...] Bogota.”37 Mexico 
was then allowed to introduce quantitative restrictions 
on imports twice, and in July 1950, the commercial trea-
ty, at this point already deprived of its original function, 
was jointly repealed by both countries without any par-
ticular consequence for the Alemán administration.
In spite of Washington’s loosening on some matters, 
Mexico’s main objective, the concession of the Export-
Import Bank loan, took more effort before it was 
achieved. Probably in response to the difficulties it was 
experiencing on this issue, during 1948, the Alemán ad-
ministration’s hostility registered a sharp raise. During 
those days, Mexico was in fact participating at the United 
Nations Habana Conference on the problems of Trade 
and Employment, and according to Ambassador Thurs-
ton, both the press and statements made by Mexican offi-
cials took the lead in opposing the proposal of the United 
States delegation and what Mexicans defined as the “ne-
farious designs” represented by US positions at the con-
ference. The Ambassador also reported that the last exam-
ple of a Government official expressing such points of 
view was:
that of no less a person than the Foreign Minister, Jaime 
Torres Bodet, who took advantage of an exchange of 
speeches with the visiting Ecuadorian Foreign Minister 
to declaim against the policies of economic domination 
pursued by the more advanced industrialist nations.38
As it was observed by British diplomats:
the direct or implied criticism of American “imperial-
ism” in many such utterances apparently seeks to 
achieve the dual object of satisfying the public dislike of 
United States influence and of goading the United States 
into buying Latin American goodwill.39
Amid what the US Ambassador defined as an “in-
crease in anti-Americanism in the departments of [the] 
Mexican government,” Mexico began its participation at 
the Bogotá Conference by adopting an attitude that close-
ly resembled the one it had maintained at Río.40 A few 
weeks before the conference, in February 1948, Ambas-
sador Thurston wrote a memorandum to the Secretary of 
State, warning that:
the public and private statements of Mexican officials 
indicate that at the Bogota Conference they will have 
very much in mind the desire of Mexico to industrialize 
itself and that they are determined to fight against any 
threat to that industrialization, whether it comes from 
the European Relief Program or any other sources. [...] 
There is an apparent definite note of suspicion regarding 
the United States’ attitude.41
When asked by the national press about the impor-
tance Mexico gave to the forthcoming conference, Torres 
Bodet expressed that it was perhaps the most important 
inter-American gathering since 1938 and that its rele-
vance was rooted in the fact that “lo que en ella se haga 
revelará hasta que punto puede ser una realidad el sueño 
de Bolívar y hasta qué extremo el panamericanismo cor-
responde a la intención de recíproca ayuda que proclaman 
nuestros Estados.”42
During the conference, Mexico’s actions and proposal 
showed how far from realization the Pan-American ideal 
Culture & History Digital Journal 4(1), June 2015, e003. eISSN 2253-797X, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/chdj.2015.003
12 • Vanni Pettinà
was. Mexican delegates insisted on the need to promote 
state-led development, proposing the creation of an Inter-
American Development Bank and the concession of long-
term developmental loans accompanied by technical co-
operation.43 Without directly mentioning the US, the 
Mexican delegates made it clear that the realization of 
these objectives was mainly an American responsibility. 
“Algunas veces se dice,” argued the Mexican Chief of 
Delegation and former director of the Banco de México, 
Eduardo Villaseñor, during a plenary session of the 
conference:
que los países latinoamericanos esperan que la asisten-
cia económica exterior venga a suplir o que deberían 
lograr con políticas interiores bien planeadas y ejecuta-
das en materias fiscales, monetarias o de crédito. Sin 
aceptar que la crítica sea justa, es claro que en la medida 
que los países que han logrado en esas ramas de la téc-
nica y de la política económica una mayor madurez, 
pongan al servicio de los otros los frutos de su experien-
cia y los asistan con su consejo, serán mayores las posi-
bilidades de estos últimos para mejorar, mediante su 
proprio esfuerzo, las condiciones de sus economías 
interiores.44
Moreover, the Mexican delegation fiercely opposed 
the idea that private capital could represent an alternative 
to public investment and restated that the former should 
always respect the primacy of national laws.
Mexico’s proposals were a straightforward opposi-
tion to what had been until then the nucleus of the 
American position with regard to inter-American eco-
nomic cooperation. In this sense, compared to Río, 
Mexico’s attitude at Bogotá offered even more tangible 
proof of the Alemán administration’s readiness to fight 
over the issue of economic cooperation and generate 
greater pressure on the US. Although the Conference 
approved the creation of the Organization of American 
States and an anti-communist declaration, its failure to 
ratify the economic chart, which was also caused by 
Mexico’s resistance and arguments, officially spoiled 
Washington’s design to build a unitary political block 
on the continent. Once again, the Alemán administra-
tion had implemented a strategy composed of resist-
ance and concessions that did not take for granted 
Mexico’s uncritical allegiance to US desires and that 
expressed increasing criticism of Washington’s poli-
cies. As an US Embassy report from Mexico City ar-
gued in March, when he came to power Alemán had 
expected “more financial help from the United States” 
and “many of the nationalistic measures which have 
been adopted by his government [...] and the anti-
American trend in his economic policy are due to his 
hope having been dashed.”45
At this point, Mexican pressure finally reached 
enough intensity to produce changes in the American ad-
ministration. Had the Export-Import Bank loan not be-
come embroiled with a harsh dispute over oil exploita-
tion, its concession could have probably been unlocked at 
the end of 1948. At the beginning of 1947, Washington 
had approached the Alemán administration in an attempt 
to discuss the possible return of American private capital 
for the exploitation of Mexican oil, which had been na-
tionalized in 1938 by President Cárdenas and since then 
had become one of the flagships of Mexican nationalism. 
After initial hesitation, the Alemán administration had de-
flected American solicitations and counterattacked by 
asking for a new, specific loan for the development of its 
oil industry. While in principle the Export-Import Bank’s 
$150 million dollar credit and the oil problem represented 
two separate issues, with the stagnation of negotiations 
on both fronts, they became gradually entangled. For four 
years, the Mexicans insisted on the concession of the oil 
loan, while the Americans, advocating the return of pri-
vate capital, put the Export/Import credit line on hold in 
the hope of overcoming the Alemán administration’s re-
sistance (Torres, 1984: 191-192).
This impasse lasted until the summer of 1950, when 
the beginning of the Korean War along with Mexico’s 
usual semi-ambiguous foreign policy broke the impasse, 
thereby giving the Alemán administration the occasion 
for a final push on the issue related to the Export-Import 
Bank credit line.
Earlier in the spring, a State Department policy pa-
per reminded Washington policymakers about the im-
portance of maintaining “Mexican support of United 
States foreign policy objectives, both political and eco-
nomic, in the hemisphere and the world,” arguing that 
“to make Mexico’s support more effective” it was nec-
essary to lend “every appropriate assistance in that 
country’s continued economic development.”46 Indeed, 
the Korean War immediately offered an opportunity to 
see how Washington’s reluctance to grant economic aid 
had pushed Mexico’s coldness to a worrisome point. As 
Roy Rubottom, a State Department leading specialist on 
Latin America, reported to Edward Miller in August, 
“Mexico and President Alemán have been unenthusias-
tic supporters of UN and U.S. action in Korea publical-
ly.” Privately, however, “Foreign Office spokesmen 
Tello and Sanchez Gavito give assurance [that] Mexico 
will come through.”47 Once again Mexico was showing, 
on a public level, a rigid and rather independent posi-
tion, while on a private one, it kept open all possibilities 
for collaboration.48
At this point, given the evidence that Mexico had al-
ready offered regarding its capacity to oppose, when 
necessary, American decisions, a double rejection on the 
oil loan and the $150 million dollar Export-Import Bank 
credit line could have clearly jeopardized Mexico’s col-
laboration with the US in the context of the Korean War. 
US diplomacy, then, quickly renounced its aspirations 
of opening Mexican oil production to private capital and 
began trying to convince the Alemán administration to 
give up on the oil loan in exchange for a conspicuous 
Export-Import Bank credit line. Finally, on August 17, 
Miller wrote to the Under Secretary of State, Webb, that 
Mexico had given its approval to withdraw the oil loan 
request if it would finally be granted a multipurpose Ex-
port-Import credit line of $150 million. “In view of 
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these considerations, and the importance of Mexican co-
operation in the crisis which we are now passing 
through,” Miller wrote, “it is hoped that the Export/Im-
port Bank will not delay any action until it is absolutely 
satisfied that Mexico has a borrowing capacity for the 
full amount of the credit.”49
The State Department’s support for the Mexican loan 
did not go unopposed. On August 21, for example, the 
Economic and Finance adviser of the Bureau of Inter-
American Affairs warned that even if the political reasons 
for the loan to Mexico were evident, the decision would 
have important political implications on “US political and 
economic relations with the other nineteen republics.” In-
deed, until then, the Export-Import Bank had refused to 
grant multipurpose long-term credit lines to other Latin 
American republics, arguing that the institution mandate 
was to finance only small and specific projects. Moreo-
ver, the Bureau pointed out that the Bank usually financed 
purchases of material and equipment produced in the US 
while Mexican operations under the proposed loans 
“would include Exim Bank dollars to finance local cur-
rency expenditures.” Finally, the Bureau insisted that 
there were serious doubts regarding Mexico’s capacity to 
fully repay the loan.50
The State Department was perfectly aware of the con-
sequences of the decision, which was even more prob-
lematic considering that only a few weeks before Brazil 
had been informed that if it wanted a long-term loan for 
development purposes, it had to look to the International 
Bank (International Bank of Reconstruction and Devel-
opment).51 However, the outlook was that the loan would 
have a very positive impact on US-Mexican bilateral rela-
tions, and after some more thought, on August 30, the US 
Administration approved of the concession for the 
amount requested by Mexico.52 After three years of in-
tense maneuvering, the Alemán administration had even-
tually gained the financial coverage to back its dreams of 
economic modernization.
CONCLUSIONS
In 1940, Mexico had 13000 industrial plants. In 1950 
the number had increased to 73000. Between 1946 and 
1952, Mexican industrial growth averaged 7.2% (Krauze, 
1997: 111). The country, driven by the state’s increasing 
initiative, experimented in deep architectural remodeling 
that brought about the building of new modernist middle-
class residential units, such as the Multifamiliar Miguel 
Alemán or the futurist University Campus of Ciudad Uni-
versitaria, both designed by the Mexican architect, and a 
student of Le Corbusier, Mario Pani. New roads, bridges, 
and dams made their appearance throughout the immense 
country, while electricity finally reached remote, rural 
hamlets. After years of violence and stagnation, Mexico 
was experiencing the shiver of modernity, a feeling that, 
amid problems and setbacks, would nonetheless last for 
many decades.
The foundations of this process were laid between 
1946 and 1952, oddly enough at the beginning of what 
was one of the most troubled epochs for Latin America. 
Compared to other regions of the Third World, in Latin 
America, the beginning of the Bipolar Conflict exasper-
ated the process of the Cold War’s binding affiliations, 
described by Arne Westad (Westad, 2013: 210). Wheth-
er other Third World countries had, at least in theory, the 
option to “seek accommodation with the United States 
or with the Soviet Union,” Latin American republics 
faced a much more restrained dynamic. Latin America, 
because of its geographical position and increasing 
American pressures determined by geopolitical calcula-
tion, but also as a consequence of the acceleration of 
economic and political integration experienced during 
the 1930s and the 1940s, was forced to seek accommo-
dation almost exclusively with the United States. This, 
however, occurred at a time when Washington’s Cold 
War strategies were stiffening the American position 
with regard to economic and political cooperation with 
Latin America, thus creating a perverse dynamic that 
lasted at least until the end of the 1950s, when the Cu-
ban Revolution forced a reappraisal of US policies on 
the continent. While in general this tightening trend 
choked Latin American political and economic aspira-
tions, Mexico presents a different trend. As this paper 
has shown, Mexico’s resilience and ability to take ad-
vantage of the new dynamics triggered by the Cold War 
were mainly based on its capacity to use its foreign poli-
cy skillfully to service its economic development plans. 
The Alemán government was indeed able to forge a 
strategy that wisely mixed constraints with the appease-
ment of its powerful neighbor, exerting an enduring 
pressure that ultimately resulted in the achievement of 
its main objectives. After four years in power, the 
Alemán administration had indeed obtained US public 
funds to cover parts of its vast industrialization project 
and had modified its commercial rules with Washington 
so that it would be able to protect its incipient national 
industry.
This study shows that there is a great need to revise 
our perspective of Latin American contemporary history. 
Its study needs to become more nuanced and must recog-
nize the existence of rather crucial exceptions to the gen-
eral trends that affected the continent and the dynamics of 
inter-American relations during the Cold War. In other 
words, the dominant perspective that sees and portrays 
Latin America as a passive testimony of the tragedies of 
post-WWII history needs to be deeply reviewed and re-
placed by a new focus on Latin American countries’ poli-
cies, efforts, and attempts to adapt to the new world pro-
jected by the Cold War. This perspective can offer a more 
balanced vision of Latin American history and can also 
lead to new ideas for comparisons between the Western 
Hemisphere and other realities found in the so-called 
Global Third World.
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